Abstract
Introduction
The problem of finding the correct probabilistic approximation of belief functions has been widely studied in the last years. A number of papers have been published on this issue [13, 14, 15] (see [1] for a review), mainly in order to find efficient implementations of the rule of combination aiming to reduce the number of focal elements in coarsened frames [14] or using hierarchical clustering [15] . Tessem [11] , for instance, incorporated only the highest-valued focal elements in his m klx approximation; a similar approach inspired the summarization technique formulated by Lowrance et al. [8] . The connection between belief functions and probabilities is as well the basement of a popular approach to the theory of evidence, Smets' pignistic model [10] . On his side, F. Voorbraak [12] proposed as solution the relative plausibility function * s P , i.e. the unique probability that, given a belief function s with plausibility P * s , assigns to each singleton its normalized plausibility. Afterwards, Cobb and Shenoy [16] described some properties of the relative plausibility of singletons and discussed its nature of probability function that is equivalent to the original belief function.
In this paper we will actually study some properties of this Bayesian function. Considering the central role of Dempster's rule of combination in the theory of evidence, we will formulate an approximation criterion based on similarity between combinations. We will show how the relative plausibility function solves a "reduced" version of the problem, as a consequence of * s P being a "perfect" representative of s in the probabilistic region P, meaning that s ⊕ t = * s P ⊕ t for each probability t where ⊕ denotes their Dempster's sum.
In the search for a general solution of this Dempster-based approximation problem, we will study the geometry of the relative plausibility function in the context of the geometric interpretation of the theory of evidence. The geometric behavior of the representation property, in particular, will suggest us a possible sketch for the general proof. The geometric analysis of belief and plausibility functions is due to the author. Black has also dedicated its doctoral thesis to the study of belief functions [2] . Another close reference could be a recent paper of Ha and Haddawy [7] in which they exploit methods of convex geometry to represent probability intervals.
The theory of evidence

Belief and plausibility functions
In the theory of evidence [6] [9] a basic probability assignment (b.p.a.) over a finite set Θ (called frame of discernment) is a function m:2
Subsets of Θ associated with non-zero values of m are called focal elements and their union core. The belief function s : 2 Θ → [0,1] associated with the basic probability assignment m is defined as:
Conversely, the basic probability assignment m of a belief function s can be uniquely recovered by means of the Moebius inversion formula [9] so that there is a 1−1 correspondence between the two set functions m ↔ s. In particular, a probability function is a peculiar belief function which satisfies the additivity rule for disjoint sets (Bayesian b.f.).
Belief functions representing distinct bodies of evidence can be combined by means of Dempster's rule [6] . 
When all the intersections between focal elements of the two functions are empty, the denominator of Equation (3) goes to zero and we say that s 1 
Belief and plausibility space
Motivated by the approximation problem, we recently introduced the language of convex geometry in the theory of evidence to study the geometry of belief functions [3, 4, 5] . Consider a frame of discernment Θ and introduce in the Euclidean space ℜ We assume the domain Θ fixed, and use the notation S to refer to the belief space. To determine which points of ℜ N "are" belief functions we can exploit the Moebius inversion lemma, by computing the corresponding b.p.a. and checking the axioms m must obey. It is not difficult to prove [3, 5] that S is convex. More precisely, if call (6) the unique belief function assigning all the mass to a single subset A of Θ, it can be proved that the belief space S coincides with the convex closure Cl of all the basis belief functions P A , (see Figure 1) ). , , Figure 1 . The belief space is a simplex whose vertices are the basis belief functions P A .
Furthermore, any belief function s ∈ S can be written as a convex sum as follows:
Since a probability is a belief function assigning non zero masses to singletons only, the set P of all the Bayesian belief functions is a subset of the boundary of S, precisely the simplex determined by all the basis functions associated with singletons:
). ,
Analogously, we can call plausibility space the region Π of ℜ N whose points correspond to admissible plausibility functions. It can be proved [4] that Π is also a simplex, (10) whose vertices Π A are exactly the plausibility functions associated with the basis belief functions P A. (11) where t ∈ S is an arbitrary belief function on the same frame, "dist" is a distance function in the Euclidean space (being the belief space a subset of ℜ N ), and C is the class of belief functions the approximation belongs to. Here we consider the class P of the Bayesian belief functions, and show how the relative plausibility function possess a peculiar property which candidates it to be the solution of the probabilistic approximation problem as posed in (11).
Dempster-based approximation
Representation
Let us compute the general form of the difference s ⊕ t -p ⊕ t, where both p and t are Bayesian belief functions. To this extent we exploit the general commutativity property we have recently proved in [3] . We just saw that any belief function s can expressed as a convex sum of simple b.f. (Equation (8)). As Dempster's rule is commutative with respect to convex combinations (see [3] 
Immediately then, if t in particular is a Bayesian b.f.
where P x is the basis belief function for the event {x}, since P p * (x) = p(x) as p is a probability. The difference s ⊕ t -p ⊕ t can hence be expressed as 
Reduced approximation criterion
An immediate consequence of Theorem 1 is that the modified version of the approximation problem in which the original b.f. is combined with all and only the Bayesian belief functions is trivially solved by 
Geometry of relative plausibilities
Plausibility of singletons
where c = ∑ x P s * (x) is the total plausibility of singletons. If we define
we can then write
Also, for any chain of subsets {x 1 
In the binary case 
words, the representatives of s in P are located on the line passing through s and * s P .
Probabilistic approximation in S 2
Let us see how the general criterion (11) works for the binary frame. The representation property allows us to rewrite the integral (11) Figure 3 ). Namely, after introducing the notation t =
where β = λ∆ st /(λ∆ st + (1−λ)∆ sc ) for (30) again. After observing that s ⊕ (1,1) = (1,1) (a trivial consequence of its definition), and remembering that Dempster's rule maps a line passing through a pair of points into another line through the images of these points [3] we get that the images s ⊕ c and s ⊕ t also lay on a line passing through (1,1)! In other words, are parallel to the line (s ⊕ c, s ⊕ t). This property is characteristic of the relative plausibility function, since for any other probability p, p ⊕ t does not lay in the intersection of this line with P. We can reasonably consider this elegant symmetry as an evidence of the correctness of our conjecture.
The picture depicted here is far from being complete, as the general case will not be a copycat of the bidimensional one. However, in this paper we have shown how the geometric approach can provide useful insights about the solution of the approximation problem. The commutativity results [3] , in particular, are powerful tools which allow us to describe Dempster's combination in a straightforward manner, eventually leading us to the solution of complex optimization problems and bringing more light on the properties of relative plausibilities. 
